Politics of Ukraine - Wikipedia
Legislative, executive, and judicial bodies shall exercise their authority within the limits determined .. of scientific relations of Ukraine with the world community. It is followed in the second section by an analysis of executive–legislative relations, which demonstrates how the key actors, the president, prime minister and. The Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) adopted the Constitution of Ukraine is exercised on the principles of its division into legislative, executive and judicial . Courts have jurisdiction over all legal relations, which develop in the State.Examining Relationship Between Executive And Legislative In 2 Years
State Committee Public Service is a central organ of executive power with activity directed and coordinated by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, any of the Vice Prime Ministers or Ministers. The State Committee Public Service puts forward propositions concerning formulation of the Government policy to the correspondent members of the Cabinet of Ministers and ensures its realization in the sphere defined, exercises control in this sphere as well as interdepartmental coordination and functional regulation on issues delegated to its authority.
Chairperson heads the State Committee Public Service. The delegation of court functions, as well as their usurpation by other bodies and officials is not allowed.
Courts have jurisdiction over all legal relations, which develop in the State.
- Chapter eight. Ukraine under the new constitution: the anatomy of a crisis
- UPDATE: A Research Guide to Ukrainian Law
- Legislation of Ukraine
The Constitution points out that the establishment of extraordinary and special courts is prohibited. The general structure of the judicial system is stipulated in Article of the Constitution of Ukraine, according to which the justice is administered by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and by courts of general jurisdiction.
The courts of general jurisdiction administer justice in the form of civil, commercial, administrative and criminal legislation. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is a special judicial body of constitutional control.
The independence of judges is guaranteed by their immunity and their election by the Supreme Rada permanently after their first appointment to the position of professional judge by the President of Ukraine for a five-year term.
In accord with the Constitution of Ukraine, single citizenship is being exercised in the country. The same concerns an alien that acquired Ukrainian citizenship who is regarded in legal relations with this country as Ukrainian subject only.
Unrelated to the fact of citizenry being it from birth or receiving it on different grounds, all the nationals use equal rights and bear identical responsibilities. The Law also stipulates the reasons for naturalization, in particular, by origin, by free choice, by reinstating citizenship, etc.
The same Law also provides for the grounds to give up Ukrainian citizenship and the procedure of carrying it out. He also tried to seduce the national-democrats by bringing some of them into the key positions. Yet the president lacked a consolidated power base in parliament.
Out of deputies, nearly half were conservatives, national-democrats had around one third of all seats, and only 77 17 percent were centrists; 28 none of them was strong enough to support him nor could he command their support on all issues.
The fact that the boundaries of the presidential sphere of competence remained ambiguous allowed various political groups in parliament to bring the issue of presidential prerogatives back onto agenda, and summon the president whenever his policies infringed on their interests.
Despite securing an array of executive powers, Kravchuk eschewed using them in order not to estrange any element in his wide yet precarious coalition of support. On the condition of the Ukr He quickly gained clout with his blunt and—as was seen by deputies—realistic assessment of the state of the economy: The government was given the right to issue decrees on practically all economic matters, except the budget, while the presidential right to do so was simultaneously suspended.
In sum, in November the prime minister undermined the powers of the president as chief executive. One of the key presidential prerogatives—the right to issue decrees with the force of law—was transferred from the president to the cabinet.
Despite having been equipped with decree-making powers, the government failed to rescue the economy. Kuchma blamed the Supreme Council and the president. Indeed, Kravchuk refused to dismiss his presidential representatives who, according to prime minister, obstructed economic reforms at the local level.
Arguing that a minimum period of two years should be allowed for economic stabilisation, Kuchma proposed not only the extension of decree-making powers, but also demanded additional authority. It refused to extend extraordinary powers to the government, yet deputies voted against releasing Kuchma from the premiership.
In mid, the president and prime minister clashed in their attempts to become the sole heads of the executive branch. This was a result of the half-hearted incorporation of elements of the presidential system, which posed the vexed question of the division of powers between the two constituent parts of the executive branch. As Kuchma persisted in securing more decision making powers, Kravchuk attempted to restore his damaged authority.
The unstructured parliament emerged as an arbiter in the intra-executive tussle, which presaged the deepening constitutional crisis in Ukraine in the second year of independence. By putting forward an overtly political platform, as well as making economic demands, the strike threatened further political destabilisation in Ukraine. The strike leaders in close alliance with the regional state apparatus demanded, apart from political autonomy for Donbas, referenda on confidence in parliament and the president.
In order to deal with economic demands, Kravchuk brought the Mayor of Donetsk, Efim Zhviagilsky, to Kyiv to take up the influential post of first deputy prime minister. While the issue of autonomy moved onto the backburner, the striking miners demanded a special session of parliament, which convened on 14—16 June. The debates fully unveiled the scale of paralysis at the centre. Parliament engaged in mutual recriminations; all main parties and factions declared themselves to be in opposition to each other and to the executive branch.
Both the right- and left-wing accused the government of implementing the policies of their adversaries. The elections, scheduled for the autumns of andrespectively, were brought forward to March and June Aware of its critically low popularity in society, the Supreme Council feared that the result of the referendum would not be favourable, so that the pre-term elections would have to follow anyway.
Shortly after Kuchma finally resigned in SeptemberKravchuk issued a decree in which he subordinated government to the president, suspended the post of prime minister, and appointed a caretaker government with Efim Zhviagilskyi as acting prime minister until the spring elections. Having had second thoughts about the pre-term elections, Kravchuk began to put pressure on the Supreme Council to rescind its September resolution.
Having developed presidential ambitions, Pliushch had a vested interest in preserving the structure of the soviets in order to use them as a vehicle for the presidency. By autumn ofthe collapsing economy and political stalemate forced the elites to resort to the ballot box as a way out of the crisis.
The drafting of the fully-fledged constitution became caught in the same tug-of-war between the key members of the elites, and the content of the drafts mirrored the changing political fortunes of the main office holders. In contrast to the intra-executive conflict between president Kravchuk and prime minister Kuchma, constitution-drafting became a battlefield between Kravchuk and Pliushch. When its chairman Kravchuk was elected president, he proposed that the chairman of parliament Pliushch be co-opted as his deputy in order to make the Commission more representative.
However, as the Constitutional Commission was a parliamentary commission, the Supreme Council insisted on Pliushch becoming chairman.
A compromise emerged when Pliushch was appointed co-chairman with Kravchuk in April This leadership of the Commission to a large extent determined the form of government envisaged in the consecutive drafts, irrespective of the agreed provisions of the Concept.
Initially, it was Kravchuk who was well positioned to turn the aggrandisement of the presidency in early into a pillar of the new constitutional edifice, whereas in Pliushch took over the initiative. In terms of the form of government, the draft envisaged a presidential system.
The wide-ranging powers granted to the president in the spring were not only copied in the constitutional draft, they were widened even further. The issue of bi-cameralism, first raised inre-emerged on the agenda, but no agreement was reached. Thus two versions—one with a uni- and the other a bi-cameral legislature—were prepared despite the fact that the Concept envisaged a uni-cameral parliament. According to the bi-cameral version, the legislature Natsionalni Zbory would consist of a Rada Deputativ lower chamber and Rada Posliv upper chamber ; the latter would consist of 5 representatives of each oblast.
However, a major breakthrough was made as the system of soviets was finally abandoned. Representatives at the oblast and raion level were to be appointed by the president from a list proposed by respective councils.
The draft left the issue of the form of elections— whether direct or indirect—to councils at the oblast and raion level indeterminate there were two variants in art.
Thereby the role of oblast and raion remained unclear. Self-government was explicitly guaranteed only at the community level cities and villages. The Crimean Republic was defined as a state-territorial organisation of power and self-government of the population of Crimea art. However, because of the ongoing confrontation between Kyiv and Simferopol, its powers were not outlined in the constitution.
Yet the incumbent did not seek quick ratification of the constitution, perhaps realising the difficulties in mastering a constitutional majority for such a pro-presidential constitution in the Supreme Council where he lacked a stable powerbase. Following the consultations a revised draft of the new constitution was ready in Julydebated in parliament on 5—8 September and finalised by the end of October By that time, Ukraine was engulfed in the political crisis and new constitution was anything but priority.
The draft endorsed the superiority of the uni-cameral legislature the name Verkhovna Rada was preserved.
UPDATE: A Research Guide to Ukrainian Law - GlobaLex
It was the only institution authorised to represent the people, with powers to decide on any issue that was not defined in the constitution as lying exclusively in the competencies of other state or self-governing institutions. The cabinet was to carry out the programme of the president, but be accountable to the Supreme Council.
Presidential law making powers were circumvented: The vertical structure of presidential representatives was abolished in the draft. The only major prerogative of the president was the right to veto laws, which could be overridden by a twothirds majority.
Even if the draft retreated from the presidential form government, it did not quite go back to the soviet system. The territorial division of power in the draft was a hybrid containing elements of the system of soviet and self-government. After Octoberthe Supreme Council did not resume debates on the draft constitution. The last meeting of the Constitutional Commission in Januaryto which also heads of oblast councils, presidential representatives, and representatives of political parties were invited, amounted to a last desperate attempt to find a way to pass the constitution.
Whilst a constitutional conference, constitutional assembly, and a referendum were being considered, the total lack of direction for the constitutional process became only too evident.
Politics of Ukraine
The law was to reinstate his lapsed authority. By that time the Commission members were even unclear as to what was the purpose of the meeting and subject of the debate.
The constitutional lawyers ended up rewriting the constitutional draft to suit the aspirations of the power holders. With the key actors driven by narrowly defined self-interest, there was not much chance to re-think and elaborate on the broad principles of the new constitutional order. While pre-term elections were opted for in order to defuse the political stalemate in Ukraine, the draft constitution was put onto the backburner, and effectively forgotten, especially as it did not suit the new president.
When in the process was re-launched it started virtually from scratch. Yet such actions do not necessarily lead to lasting changes to the institutional structure. Because of the abolition of the CPU in the aftermath of the August coup, the political class of communists—unlikely architects of a new order—came out unscathed from the turmoil of the collapse of the USSR, and found itself at the helm of a new state. The tensions surrounding the Black Sea Fleet and denuclearisation fuelled the perception that both Russia and the West treated Ukrainian sovereignty as a temporary phenomenon, while Crimean separatism vividly demonstrated the fragility of the new state under the pressure of centrifugal forces.
In any case, the former opposition could hardly act as an agent of reform, not only because its conflicting priorities, but also because of its relative numerical weakness. They attempted to re-assign the Kompetentz on an almost daily basis, as a wealth of opportunities and dearth of constraints spawned a chaotic search for instant institutional powers. The members of the excommunist elites, Kravchuk, Kuchma and Pliushch, attempted to reshuffle the prerogatives on the grounds of state building, a demanded strengthening of executive authority which was to be vested in the president, government and parliament, respectively.
In their hectic tinkering with institutional powers, the individuals focused only on particular prerogatives such as, for example, decree-making powers without an overarching vision of the form of government.
As this frantic search failed to produce the outcome desired by any of the actors, they resorted to the ballot box to resolve the conflict. This diffidence comes as a surprise in light of the desperate need to counteract the growing political disarray and the economic crisis.
It could not offer much of an organising framework and ceased to be respected by all political forces. This clumsy approach only worsened the problems stemming from the essentially hybrid nature of the institutional framework as initially amended in While the expanded presidency existed alongside the vertical of soviets subordinated to the Supreme Council, their respective domains of authority were unclear.
The rushed and ill thought-out constitutional amendments resulted in numerous contradictions and loopholes. Why did Ukraine escape such a scenario? Essentially, the key actors were not strong enough to impose their preferences. Fragmented elites and cross-cutting cleavages prevented any one individual or grouping from garnering lasting support and from being in control of the developments for a prolonged period. Moreover, the lesson from the Russian experience timely prompted the Ukrainian elites to search for a consensual way to diffuse the potentially explosive situation in the autumn of Thus, pre-term elections were opted for.
The period illustrates the idiosyncrasy of the state-building processes. Not all planks of statehood could be erected simultaneously, and while the external dimension embassies, army, currency, international recognition was swiftly taken care of by the elites, other fundamental issues, such as deciding on the form of government, remained unresolved. Yet, despite the symbolic affirmation of unity, the inability to check the political and economic disarray led not only to a constitutional crisis, but also to a threat to the new state because of the intensification of centrifugal tendencies see next chapter.
But by the necessary differentiation between the governing functions could be delayed no longer. The desperate need for economic stabilisation and the organisation of centre—periphery relations meant that the question of what kind of institutions Ukraine should be furnished with had to be resolved.
As will be argued in the next chapter, the elections marked the revival of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the rejuvenated Left emerged as the strongest political orientation with the platform of restoring the status quo ante. Once constitution making got under way again, the Right and Left put forward diametrically different conceptions of statehood, and in particular, the highly charged problem of nationhood surfaced and got entangled with other issues, which further compounded the complexity of constitution making in Ukraine.
Party factions were denied formal recognition and material resources, and co-existed with groups of deputies created on the basis of profession, e. Representatives of the deputatsii were still granted the right to speak on a par with party-based factions. Cambridge University Press,p. Further to the right were more radical, nationalist parties, which to a large extent remained outside parliament.