Meet the Press - Wikipedia
Table 1: Top five (5) prominent themes in the and election campaigns also explore the extent to which the press met the constitutional. Indeed, the majority of English-language press outlets that cover (Read a critique of Sierra Leone's media during the election here.) . He returned to meet with President Koroma and encourage tourism in and again in Copyright © | MH Purity lite WordPress Theme by MH Themes. Meet the Press is a weekly American television news/interview program broadcast on NBC. . was named the interim moderator through the general elections. with the Meet the Press theme music in a shorter " modernized [style] the . January 1, , Des Moines, Iowa, Interview with Rick Santorum, two days.
So I've spent some time thinking about how I could best advance the cause of change and progress that we so desperately need. I know that I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington, but I've been there long enough to know that the ways of Washington must change.
People who love their country can change it. It is time for us to fundamentally change our policy. It is time to give Iraqis their country back.
445 results for your search
And it is time to refocus America's efforts on the challenges we face at home and the wider struggle against terror yet to be won. I certainly didn't expect to find myself in this position a year ago. I've been struck by how hungry we all are for a different kind of politics.
So I've spent some time thinking about how I could best advance the cause of change and progress that we so desperately need The decisions that have been made in Washington these past six years, and the problems that have been ignored, have put our country in a precarious place.
America's faced big problems before. But today, our leaders in Washington seem incapable of working together in a practical, commonsense way. Politics has become so bitter and partisan, so gummed up by money and influence, that we can't tackle the big problems that demand solutions.Chuck Todd's First Meet The Press
In a video posting, announcing his candidacy for President of the United States 16 January There are countless reasons the American people have lost confidence in the President's Iraq policy, but chief among them has been the administration's insistence on making promises and assurances about progress and victory that do not appear to be grounded in the reality of the facts. We have been told we would be greeted as liberators. We have been promised the insurgency was in its last throes.
We have been assured again and again that we are making progress and that the Iraqis would soon stand up so we could stand down and our brave sons and daughters could start coming home. We have been asked to wait, we have been asked to be patient, and we have been asked to give the President and the new Iraqi Government 6 more months, and then 6 more months after that, and then 6 more months after that.
I have also tried to act responsibly in that opposition to ensure that, having made the decision to go into Iraq, we provide our troops, who perform valiantly, the support they need to complete their mission. I have also stated publicly that I think we have both strategic interests and humanitarian responsibilities in ensuring that Iraq is as stable as possible under the circumstances.
Finally, I said publicly that it is my preference not to micromanage the Commander-in-Chief in the prosecution of war. Ultimately, I do not believe that is the ideal role for Congress to play. But at a certain point, we have to draw a line. At a certain point, the American people have to have some confidence that we are not simply going down this blind alley in perpetuity.
When it comes to the war in Iraq, the time for promises and assurances, for waiting and patience is over. Too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent for us to trust the President on another tried-and-failed policy, opposed by generals and experts, opposed by Democrats and Republicans, opposed by Americans and even the Iraqis themselves.
It is time to change our policy. It is time to give Iraqis their country back, and it is time to refocus America's effort on the wider struggle against terror yet to be won.
Our troops have done all that we have asked them to do and more.
But no amount of American soldiers can solve the political differences at the heart of somebody else's civil war, nor settle the grievances in the hearts of the combatants.
It is my firm belief that the responsible course of action - for the United States, for Iraq, and for our troops - is to oppose this reckless escalation and to pursue a new policy.
This policy that I've laid out is consistent with what I have advocated for well over a year, with many of the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, and with what the American people demanded in the November election. When it comes to the war in Iraq, the time for promises and assurances, for waiting and patience, is over. Too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent for us to trust the President on another tried and failed policy opposed by generals and experts, Democrats and Republicans, Americans and many of the Iraqis themselves.
The notion that as a consequence of that [ Congressional] authorization, the president can continue down a failed path without any constraints from Congress whatsoever is wrong and is not warranted by our Constitution. Interview on Iraq with the Associated Press 30 January I recognize there is a certain presumptuousness in this, a certain audacity, to this announcement.
Announcement of Candidacy for President of the United States. We are distracted from our real failures and told to blame the other party, or gay people, or immigrants, and as people have looked away in frustration and disillusionment, we know who has filled the void.
The cynics, the lobbyists, the special interests, who've turned government into only a game they can afford to play. The efficiency and scale of that process put the Democrats well ahead when it came to profiling voters.
Within the campaign, however, the Obama data operations were understood to have shortcomings. Obama would run his final race not as an insurgent against a party establishment, but as the establishment itself. Their demands, not the offerings of consultants and vendors, would shape the marketplace. The committee installed a Siemens Enterprise System phone-dialing unit that could put out 1.
- '12 Meet the Press transcripts, resources, video
- Barack Obama
- How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters
The chastening losses they had experienced in Washington separated them from those who had known only the ecstasies of At the same time, they knew they would need to succeed at registering and mobilizing new voters, especially in some of the fastest-growing demographic categories, to make up for any voters who did defect. But within the campaign, the goal was literal.
They would reassemble the coalition, one by one, through personal contacts. This reflected a principled imperative to challenge the political establishment with an empirical approach to electioneering, and it was greatly influenced by David Plouffe, the campaign manager, who loved metrics, spreadsheets, and performance reports. Plouffe wanted to know: How much money did that ad campaign bring in?
But for all its reliance on data, the Obama campaign had remained insulated from the most important methodological innovation in 21st-century politics. InYale professors Don Green and Alan Gerber conducted the first randomized controlled trial in modern political science, assigning New Haven voters to receive nonpartisan election reminders by mail, phone, or in-person visit from a canvasser and measuring which group saw the greatest increase in turnout.
The subsequent wave of field experiments by Green, Gerber, and their followers focused on mobilization, testing competing modes of contact and get-out-the-vote language to see which were most successful. The first Obama campaign used the findings of such tests to tweak call scripts and canvassing protocols, but it never fully embraced the experimental revolution itself.
The breakthrough was that registration no longer had to be approached passively; organizers did not have to simply wait for the unenrolled to emerge from anonymity, sign a form, and, they hoped, vote. New techniques made it possible to intelligently profile nonvoters: Applying microtargeting models identified which nonregistrants were most likely to be Democrats and which ones Republicans. The Obama campaign embedded social scientists from the Analyst Institute among its staff.
Party officials knew that adding new Democratic voters to the registration rolls was a crucial element in their strategy for It wanted to take on the most vexing problem in politics: The expansion of individual-level data had made possible the kind of testing that could help do that.
Experimenters had typically calculated the average effect of their interventions across the entire population.
When the group sent direct mail in favor of Democratic gubernatorial candidates, it barely budged those whose scores placed them in the middle of the partisan spectrum; it had a far greater impact upon those who had been profiled as soft or nonideological Republicans.
That test, and others that followed, demonstrated the limitations of traditional targeting. Such techniques rested on a series of long-standing assumptions—for instance, that middle-of-the-roaders were the most persuadable and that infrequent voters were the likeliest to be captured in a get-out-the-vote drive. But the experiments introduced new uncertainty. People who were identified as having a 50 percent likelihood of voting for a Democrat might in fact be torn between the two parties, or they might look like centrists only because no data attached to their records pushed a partisan prediction in one direction or another.
The traditional way of doing this had been to audition themes and language in focus groups and then test the winning material in polls to see which categories of voters responded positively to each approach. Any insights were distorted by the artificial settings and by the tiny samples of demographic subgroups in traditional polls. And people have been doing that for decades! Experimenters would randomly assign voters to receive varied sequences of direct mail—four pieces on the same policy theme, each making a slightly different case for Obama—and then use ongoing survey calls to isolate the attributes of those whose opinions changed as a result.
The experiment revealed how much voter response differed by age, especially among women. Older women thought more highly of the policies when they received reminders about preventive care; younger women liked them more when they were told about contraceptive coverage and new rules that prohibited insurance companies from charging women more.
The Mission (theme music) - Wikipedia
The results were surprising. Those scores suggested that they probably shared Republican attitudes; but here was one thing that could pull them to Obama. Traditionally, campaigns have restricted their persuasion efforts to channels like mass media or direct mail, where they can control presentation, language, and targeting.
Sending volunteers to persuade voters would mean forcing them to interact with opponents, or with voters who were undecided because they were alienated from politics on delicate issues like abortion. They began sending trained volunteers to knock on doors or make phone calls with the objective of changing minds. That dramatic shift in the culture of electioneering was felt on the streets, but it was possible only because of advances in analytics.
Likely Obama supporters would get regular reminders from their local field organizers, asking them to return their ballots, and, once they had, a message thanking them and proposing other ways to be involved in the campaign. The local organizer would receive daily lists of the voters on his or her turf who had outstanding ballots so that the campaign could follow up with personal contact by phone or at the doorstep.
Wagner, however, was turning his attention beyond the field. Throughout the primaries, Romney had appeared to be the only Republican running a 21st-century campaign, methodically banking early votes in states like Florida and Ohio before his disorganized opponents could establish operations there. Such techniques had offered George W.
ByDemocrats had not only matched Republicans in adopting commercial marketing techniques; they had moved ahead by integrating methods developed in the social sciences. That was the structure Obama had abandoned after winning the nomination in Instead, they fixated on trying to unlock one big, persistent mystery, which Lundry framed this way: TargetPoint also integrated content collected from newspaper websites and closed-caption transcripts of broadcast programs.
Ultimately, Lundry wanted to assess the impact that each type of public attention had on what mattered most to them: He turned to vector autoregression models, which equities traders use to isolate the influence of single variables on market movements.
That informal conversation among political-class elites typically led to traditional print or broadcast press coverage one to two days later, and that, in turn, might have an impact on the horse race. Those insights offered campaign officials a theory of information flows, but they provided no guidance in how to allocate campaign resources in order to win the Electoral College.
The goal was to try to divine the calculations behind those decisions. In early September, as part of his standard review, Lundry noticed that the week after the Democratic convention, Obama had aired 68 ads in Dothan, Alabama, a town near the Florida border.
Even though the area was known to savvy ad buyers as one of the places where a media market crosses state lines, Dothan TV stations reached only about 9, Florida voters, and around 7, of them had voted for John McCain in But they were advertising there.
Already the Obama campaign was known for its relentless e-mails beseeching supporters to give their money or time, but this one offered something that intrigued Davidsen: With Narwhal, e-mail blasts asking people to volunteer could take their past donation history into consideration, and the algorithms determining how much a supporter would be asked to contribute could be shaped by knowledge about his or her reaction to previous solicitations.
Now analysts could leverage personal data to identify the attributes of those who responded, and use that knowledge to refine subsequent appeals. Television and radio ads had to be purchased by geographic zone, and the available data on who watches which channels or shows, collected by research firms like Nielsen and Scarborough, often included little more than viewer age and gender.
How you knit that together is a challenge. But when it came to buying media, such calculations had been simply impossible, because campaigns were unable to link what they knew about voters to what cable providers knew about their customers. Walsh says of the effort to reimagine the media-targeting process: It was to find out how many of our persuadable voters were watching those dayparts. For privacy reasons, however, the information was not available at the individual level.
The Obama campaign had created its own television ratings system, a kind of Nielsen in which the only viewers who mattered were those not yet fully committed to a presidential candidate.
But Davidsen had to get the information into a practical form by early May, when Obama strategists planned to start running their anti-Romney ads.