Inequalities word problems (video) | Khan Academy
don't want you to think that the Normal distribution has anything to do with the .. current state of knowledge in a particular scientific field. On the .. outcome variable measured on each experimental unit (person, animal, factory, . When a variable meets the definition of quantitative, but it is an explanatory. I know it's a traditional song that goes back a long way and the lyrics vary a bit between versions. I've always considered the Pogues version. "I'm a Man You Don't Meet Every Day"(Roud ) is a traditional Scottish or Irish music hall I'm a Man You Don't Meet Every Day Lyrics and chords.
So we know that in primate hierarchies, if an alpha needs to take over, if an individual needs to take over an alpha role sort of suddenly, within a few days, that individual's testosterone has gone up significantly and his cortisol has dropped significantly. So we have this evidence, both that the body can shape the mind, at least at the facial level, and also that role changes can shape the mind.
So what happens, okay, you take a role change, what happens if you do that at a really minimal level, like this tiny manipulation, this tiny intervention? We decided to bring people into the lab and run a little experiment, and these people adopted, for two minutes, either high-power poses or low-power poses, and I'm just going to show you five of the poses, although they took on only two.
This one has been dubbed the "Wonder Woman" by the media. Here are a couple more. So you can be standing or you can be sitting. And here are the low-power poses. So you're folding up, you're making yourself small.
This one is very low-power. When you're touching your neck, you're really protecting yourself. So this is what happens. They come in, they spit into a vial, for two minutes, we say, "You need to do this or this. We don't want to prime them with a concept of power.
We want them to be feeling power. So two minutes they do this. We then ask them, "How powerful do you feel? That's the whole experiment. So this is what we find. Risk tolerance, which is the gambling, we find that when you are in the high-power pose condition, 86 percent of you will gamble.
When you're in the low-power pose condition, only 60 percent, and that's a whopping significant difference. Here's what we find on testosterone.
From their baseline when they come in, high-power people experience about a percent increase, and low-power people experience about a percent decrease. So again, two minutes, and you get these changes.
Here's what you get on cortisol. High-power people experience about a percent decrease, and the low-power people experience about a percent increase. So two minutes lead to these hormonal changes that configure your brain to basically be either assertive, confident and comfortable, or really stress-reactive, and feeling sort of shut down.
And we've all had the feeling, right? So it seems that our nonverbals do govern how we think and feel about ourselves, so it's not just others, but it's also ourselves.
Also, our bodies change our minds. But the next question, of course, is, can power posing for a few minutes really change your life in meaningful ways? This is in the lab, it's this little task, it's just a couple of minutes. Where can you actually apply this?
Which we cared about, of course. And so we think where you want to use this is evaluative situations, like social threat situations. Where are you being evaluated, either by your friends? For teenagers, it's at the lunchroom table. For some people it's speaking at a school board meeting. It might be giving a pitch or giving a talk like this or doing a job interview.
We decided that the one that most people could relate to because most people had been through, was the job interview. So we published these findings, and the media are all over it, and they say, Okay, so this is what you do when you go in for the job interview, right?
Laughter You know, so we were of course horrified, and said, Oh my God, no, that's not what we meant at all. For numerous reasons, no, don't do that. Again, this is not about you talking to other people. It's you talking to yourself. What do you do before you go into a job interview? You're looking at your iPhone — or your Android, not trying to leave anyone out.
You're looking at your notes, you're hunching up, making yourself small, when really what you should be doing maybe is this, like, in the bathroom, right? So that's what we want to test. So we bring people into a lab, and they do either high- or low-power poses again, they go through a very stressful job interview. It's five minutes long. They are being recorded.
They're being judged also, and the judges are trained to give no nonverbal feedback, so they look like this. Imagine this is the person interviewing you. So for five minutes, nothing, and this is worse than being heckled.
It's what Marianne LaFrance calls "standing in social quicksand.
So this is the job interview we put them through, because we really wanted to see what happened. We then have these coders look at these tapes, four of them. They're blind to the hypothesis. They're blind to the conditions. They have no idea who's been posing in what pose, and they end up looking at these sets of tapes, and they say, "We want to hire these people," all the high-power posers.
We also evaluate these people much more positively overall. It's not about the content of the speech. It's about the presence that they're bringing to the speech.
Because we rate them on all these variables related to competence, like, how well-structured is the speech? How good is it? What are their qualifications? No effect on those things. This is what's affected. These kinds of things. People are bringing their true selves, basically. They bring their ideas, but as themselves, with no, you know, residue over them. So this is what's driving the effect, or mediating the effect. So when I tell people about this, that our bodies change our minds and our minds can change our behavior, and our behavior can change our outcomes, they say to me, "It feels fake.
So I said, fake it till you make it. I don't want to get there and then still feel like a fraud. I don't want to feel like an impostor. I don't want to get there only to feel like I'm not supposed to be here.
And that really resonated with me, because I want to tell you a little story about being an impostor and feeling like I'm not supposed to be here. When I was 19, I was in a really bad car accident. I was thrown out of a car, rolled several times. I was thrown from the car.
And I woke up in a head injury rehab ward, and I had been withdrawn from college, and I learned that my IQ had dropped by two standard deviations, which was very traumatic. I knew my IQ because I had identified with being smart, and I had been called gifted as a child. So I'm taken out of college, I keep trying to go back. They say, "You're not going to finish college.
I'm a Man You Don't Meet Every Day - Wikipedia
Just, you know, there are other things for you to do, but that's not going to work out for you. So I felt entirely powerless. I worked and worked, and I got lucky, and worked, and got lucky, and worked. Eventually I graduated from college. It took me four years longer than my peers, and I convinced someone, my angel advisor, Susan Fiske, to take me on, and so I ended up at Princeton, and I was like, I am not supposed to be here. I am an impostor. And the night before my first-year talk, and the first-year talk at Princeton is a minute talk to 20 people.
I was so afraid of being found out the next day that I called her and said, "I'm quitting. You're going to stay, and this is what you're going to do. You are going to fake it. You're going to do every talk that you ever get asked to do. You're just going to do it and do it and do it, even if you're terrified and just paralyzed and having an out-of-body experience, until you have this moment where you say, 'Oh my gosh, I'm doing it.
Like, I have become this. I am actually doing this. Five years in grad school, a few years, you know, I'm at Northwestern, I moved to Harvard, I'm at Harvard, I'm not really thinking about it anymore, but for a long time I had been thinking, "Not supposed to be here. I really didn't know her at all.
She came in totally defeated, and she said, "I'm not supposed to be here. Because two things happened. One was that I realized, oh my gosh, I don't feel like that anymore.
I don't feel that anymore, but she does, and I get that feeling. And the second was, she is supposed to be here! Like, she can fake it, she can become it. So I was like, "Yes, you are! You are supposed to be here! And tomorrow you're going to fake it, you're going to make yourself powerful, and, you know — Applause And you're going to go into the classroom, and you are going to give the best comment ever. And she gave the best comment ever, and people turned around and were like, oh my God, I didn't even notice her sitting there.
Laughter She comes back to me months later, and I realized that she had not just faked it till she made it, she had actually faked it till she became it. So she had changed. And so I want to say to you, don't fake it till you make it. Fake it till you become it. Do it enough until you actually become it and internalize.
The last thing I'm going to leave you with is this. Tiny tweaks can lead to big changes. So, this is two minutes. Subjectivists believe that there are no invariant standards of meaning because meaning is relative to the subject, i. Roughly, something is meaningful for a person if she believes it to be or seeks it out.
Objectivists maintain, in contrast, that there are some invariant standards for meaning because meaning is at least partly mind-independent, i. Here, something is meaningful to some degree in virtue of its intrinsic nature, independent of whether it is believed to be meaningful or sought.
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There is logical space for an intersubjective theory according to which there are invariant standards of meaning for human beings that are constituted by what they would all agree upon from a certain communal standpoint Darwallchs.
However, this orthogonal approach is not much of a player in the field and so I set it aside in what follows. Common instances are views that one's life is more meaningful, the more one gets what one happens to want strongly, the more one achieves one's highly ranked goals, or the more one does what one believes to be really important Trisel ; Hooker ; Alexis Lately, one influential subjectivist has maintained that the relevant mental state is caring or loving, so that life is meaningful just to the extent that one cares about or loves something Frankfurt, Subjectivism was dominant for much of the 20th century when pragmatism, positivism, existentialism, noncognitivism, and Humeanism were quite influential James ; Ayer ; Sartre ; Barnes ; Taylor ; Hare ; Williams ; Klemke Such a method has been used to defend the existence of objective value, and, as a result, subjectivism about meaning has lost its dominance.
Those who continue to hold subjectivism often are suspicious of attempts to justify beliefs about objective value e. Theorists are primarily moved to accept subjectivism because the alternatives are unpalatable; they are sure that value in general and meaning in particular exists, but do not see how it could be grounded in something independent of the mind, whether it be the natural, the non-natural, or the supernatural.
In contrast to these possibilities, it appears straightforward to account for what is meaningful in terms of what people find meaningful or what people want out of life. Wide-ranging meta-ethical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language are necessary to address this rationale for subjectivism.
There are two other, more circumscribed arguments for subjectivism. One is that subjectivism is plausible since it is reasonable to think that a meaningful life is an authentic one Frankfurt If a person's life is significant insofar as she is true to herself or her deepest nature, then we have some reason to believe that meaning simply is a function of satisfying certain desires held by the individual or realizing certain ends of hers.
Another argument is that meaning intuitively comes from losing oneself, i. Work that concentrates the mind and relationships that are engrossing seem central to meaning and to be so because of the subjective element involved, that is, because of the concentration and engrossment. However, critics maintain that both of these arguments are vulnerable to a common objection: One is not really being true to oneself if one intentionally harms others Dahl12successfully maintains 3, hairs on one's head Taylor36or, well, eats one's own excrement Wielenberg22and one is also not losing oneself in a meaning-conferring way if one is consumed by these activities.
There seem to be certain actions, relationships, states, and experiences that one ought to concentrate on or be engrossed in, if meaning is to accrue. So says the objectivist, but many subjectivists also feel the pull of the point. Paralleling replies in the literature on well-being, subjectivists often respond by contending that no or very few individuals would desire to do such intuitively trivial things, at least after a certain idealized process of reflection e.
More promising, perhaps, is the attempt to ground value not in the responses of an individual valuer, but in those of a particular group Brogaard and Smith ; Wong Would such an intersubjective move avoid the counterexamples?
If so, would it do so more plausibly than an objective theory? Obtaining the object of some variable pro-attitude is not sufficient for meaning, on this view. Instead, there are certain inherently worthwhile or finally valuable conditions that confer meaning for anyone, neither merely because they are wanted, chosen, or believed to be meaningful, nor because they somehow are grounded in God. Morality and creativity are widely held instances of actions that confer meaning on life, while trimming toenails and eating snow and the other counterexamples to subjectivism above are not.
Objectivism is thought to be the best explanation for these respective kinds of judgments: To obtain meaning in one's life, one ought to pursue the former actions and avoid the latter ones. Of course, meta-ethical debates about the nature of value are again relevant here. Relatively few objectivists are pure, so construed. That is, a large majority of them believe that a life is more meaningful not merely because of objective factors, but also in part because of subjective ones such as cognition, affection, and emotion.
Most commonly held is the hybrid view captured by Susan Wolf's pithy slogan: This theory implies that no meaning accrues to one's life if one believes in, is satisfied by, or cares about a project that is not worthwhile, or if one takes up a worthwhile project but fails to judge it important, be satisfied by it, care about it or otherwise identify with it.
Different versions of this theory will have different accounts of the appropriate mental states and of worthwhileness.
The Meaning of Life
Pure objectivists deny that subjective attraction plays any constitutive role in conferring meaning on life. For instance, utilitarians with respect to meaning as opposed to morality are pure objectivists, for they claim that certain actions confer meaning on life regardless of the agent's reactions to them. On this view, the more one benefits others, the more meaningful one's life, regardless of whether one enjoys benefiting them, believes they should be aided, etc. Midway between pure objectivism and the hybrid theory is the view that having certain propositional attitudes toward finally good activities would enhance the meaning of life without being necessary for it Audi For instance, might a Mother Teresa who is bored by her substantial charity work have a significant existence because of it, even if she would have an even more significant existence if she were excited by it?
There have been several attempts to theoretically capture what all objectively attractive, inherently worthwhile, or finally valuable conditions have in common insofar as they bear on meaning.
Some believe that they can all be captured as actions that are creative Taylorwhile others maintain that they are exhibit rightness or virtue and perhaps also involve reward proportionate to morality Kantpt. Most objectivists, however, deem these respective aesthetic and ethical theories to be too narrow, even if living a moral life is necessary for a meaningful one Landau It seems to most in the field not only that creativity and morality are independent sources of meaning, but also that there are sources in addition to these two.
For just a few examples, consider making an intellectual discovery, rearing children with love, playing music, and developing superior athletic ability. So, in the literature one finds a variety of principles that aim to capture all these and other apparent objective grounds of meaning.
One can read the perfectionist tradition as proffering objective theories of what a significant existence is, even if their proponents do not frequently use contemporary terminology to express this. Consider Aristotle's account of the good life for a human being as one that fulfills its natural purpose qua rational, Marx's vision of a distinctly human history characterized by less alienation and more autonomy, culture, and community, and Nietzsche's ideal of a being with a superlative degree of power, creativity, and complexity.
More recently, some have maintained that objectively meaningful conditions are just those that involve: One major test of these theories is whether they capture all experiences, states, relationships, and actions that intuitively make life meaningful.
The more counterexamples of apparently meaningful conditions that a principle entails lack meaning, the less justified the principle.
There is as yet no convergence in the field on any one principle or even cluster as accounting for commonsensical judgments about meaning to an adequate, convincing degree.
Indeed, some believe the search for such a principle to be pointless Wolf b, 12—13; Kekes ; Schmidtz Are these pluralists correct, or does the field have a good chance of discovering a single, basic property that grounds all the particular ways to acquire meaning in life?
Another important way to criticize these theories is more comprehensive: Furthermore, a life that not only avoids repetition but also ends with a substantial amount of meaningful parts seems to have more meaning overall than one that has the same amount of meaningful parts but ends with few or none of them Kamm— Extreme versions of holism are also present in the literature.
For example, some maintain that the only bearer of final value is life as a whole, which entails that there are strictly speaking no parts or segments of a life that can be meaningful in themselves Tabensky ; Levinson For another example, some accept that both parts of a life and a life as a whole can be independent bearers of meaning, but maintain that the latter has something like a lexical priority over the former when it comes to what to pursue or otherwise to prize Blumenfeld What are the ultimate bearers of meaning?
What are all the fundamentally different ways if any that holism can affect meaning? Are they all a function of narrativity, life-stories, and artistic self-expression as per Kauppinenor are there holistic facets of life's meaning that are not a matter of such literary concepts? How much importance should they be accorded by an agent seeking meaning in her life?
Nihilism So far, I have addressed theoretical accounts that have been naturally understood to be about what confers meaning on life, which obviously assumes that some lives are in fact meaningful. However, there are nihilistic perspectives that question this assumption. According to nihilism or pessimismwhat would make a life meaningful either cannot obtain or as a matter of fact simply never does. One straightforward rationale for nihilism is the combination of supernaturalism about what makes life meaningful and atheism about whether God exists.
If you believe that God or a soul is necessary for meaning in life, and if you believe that neither exists, then you are a nihilist, someone who denies that life has meaning. Albert Camus is famous for expressing this kind of perspective, suggesting that the lack of an afterlife and of a rational, divinely ordered universe undercuts the possibility of meaning Camus ; cf. Interestingly, the most common rationales for nihilism these days do not appeal to supernaturalism.
The idea shared among many contemporary nihilists is that there is something inherent to the human condition that prevents meaning from arising, even granting that God exists. For instance, some nihilists make the Schopenhauerian claim that our lives lack meaning because we are invariably dissatisfied; either we have not yet obtained what we seek, or we have obtained it and are bored Martin Critics tend to reply that at least a number of human lives do have the requisite amount of satisfaction required for meaning, supposing that some is Blackburn74— Furthermore, contemporary rationalist and realist work in meta-ethics has led many to believe that such a moral system exists.
In the past 10 years, some interesting new defences of nihilism have arisen that merit careful consideration. According to one rationale, for our lives to matter, we must in a position to add value to the world, which we are not since the value of the world is already infinite Smith The key premises for this view are that every bit of space-time or at least the stars in the physical universe have some positive value, that these values can be added up, and that space is infinite.
If the physical world at present contains an infinite degree of value, nothing we do can make a difference in terms of meaning, for infinity plus any amount of value must be infinity. One way to question this argument is to suggest that even if one cannot add to the value of the universe, meaning plausibly obtains merely by being the source of value. Consider that one does not merely want one's child to be reared with love, but wants to be the one who rears one's child with love.
And this desire remains even knowing that others would have reared one's child with love in one's absence, so that one's actions are not increasing the goodness of the state of the universe relative to what it would have had without them.
Another fresh argument for nihilism is forthcoming from certain defenses of anti-natalism, the view that it is immoral to bring new people into existence because doing so would be a harm to them.
There are now a variety of rationales for anti-natalism, but most relevant to debates about whether life is meaningful is probably the following argument from David Benatar18— According to him, the bads of existing e. If indeed the state of not existing is no worse than that of experiencing the benefits of existence, then, since existing invariably brings harm in its wake, existing is always a net harm compared to not existing.
Although this argument is about goods such as pleasures in the first instance, it seems generalizable to non-experiential goods, including that of meaning in life. The criticisms of Benatar that promise to cut most deep are those that question his rationale for the above judgments of good and bad. He maintains that these appraisals best explain, e. The former would be wrong and the latter would not be wrong, for Benatar, because no pain in non-existence is better than pain in existence, and because no pleasure in non-existence is no worse than pleasure in existence.
Critics usually grant the judgments of wrongness, but provide explanations of them that do not invoke Benatar's judgments of good and bad that apparently lead to anti-natalism e. This survey closes by discussing the most well-known rationale for nihilism, namely, Thomas Nagel's invocation of the external standpoint that purportedly reveals our lives to be unimportant see also Hanfling22—24; Benatar60—92; cf.
According to Nagel, we are capable of comprehending the world from a variety of standpoints that are either internal or external. The most internal perspective would be a particular human being's desire at a given instant, with a somewhat less internal perspective being one's interests over a life-time, and an even less internal perspective being the interests of one's family or community.
When one takes up this most external standpoint and views one's finite—and even downright puny—impact on the world, little of one's life appears to matter. What one does in a certain society on Earth over an approximately 75 years just does not amount to much, when considering the billions of years and likely trillions of beings that are a part of space-time.
Very few accept the authority of the most external standpoint Ellin—17; Blackburn79—80; Schmidtz or the implications that Nagel believes it has for the meaning of our lives Quinn65—66; Singer—34; Wolf b, 19— However, the field could use much more discussion of this rationale, given its persistence in human thought.
It is plausible to think, with Nagel, that part of what it is to be a person is to be able to take up an external standpoint. However, what precisely is a standpoint?
Must we invariably adopt one standpoint or the other, or is it possible not to take one up at all? Is there a reliable way to ascertain which standpoint is normatively more authoritative than others? These and the other questions posed in this survey still lack conclusive answers, another respect in which the field of life's meaning is tantalizingly open for substantial contributions.
Works Cited Affolter, J. Oxford University Press, A Humanist Perspective, Amherst: Must Immortality Be Meaningless? Religion, Philosophy and Human Value, Cambridge: Morality and the Meaning of Life, Ft. Princeton University Press, Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, S. A Theistic Perspective, New York: University of Notre Dame Press: Essays in Honour of John Cottingham, N.
Henry Holt and Company: Metaphysics and Ethics, P. An Analytic Study, Oxford: A Defense of Christianity, Grand Rapids: Pascal and the Meaning of Life, Grand Rapids: Essays for John Rawls, A. Life, Death, and Immortality, L. The Creation of Value, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Essays at the Intersection, H. The Quest for Truth, L. University of California Press: A Reader, 3rd Ed. Meaning in Life, Philosophical Papers, An Anthology and Guide, Oxford: The Meaning of Life, The Monist, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, London: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: